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Editor's Note: On March 1, 1996, the Govermnent Law Center of
Albany Lav School and the Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law
Center co-sponsored a Symposium on State Constitutional Law:
Adjudication and Refonn. The Touro Law Review published a
transcript of the Symposiun's proceedings in an earlier issue, see
Rights and Freedoms Under the State Constitution, 13 ToURo L. REi:
59 (1996). Prof. Helen Hershkoff participated in the Sympositma but.
because of the Review's deadline pressure, was not given an opportunity
to review the transcript of her remarks prior to publication. We are
now happy to correct the record by publishing a revised version of her
talk.
RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS UNDER THE STATE
CONSTITUTION: A NEW DEAL FOR WELFARE
RIGHTS
Helen Hershkoffr
Legal theorists increasingly recognize the New Deal as a
transformative moment in American legal thought. Cass R.
Sunstein writes of "constitutionalism after the New Deal" and its
implications for regulatory administration. I Bruce A. Ackerman
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1996. The arguments in this essay are developed more fully in my
forthcoming article, State Courts, Welfare Rights. and the Hart & Wechsler
Paradigm, N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE (forthcoming 1997). prepared in
connection with the 1996 New York University School of Law Review of Law
and Social Change Colloquium on Confronting Welfare Reform: Strategies for
Advocates. Timothy Corbett, Edward A. King, Gregory Racz. and especially
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support for this research.
1. Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal. 101 Harv. L.
REv. 421 (1987) (urging a reexamination of New Deal constitutionalism.
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focuses on the New Deal as part of our nation's continuing
founding, describing the ways in which a mobilized "We the
People" effected constitutional change outside the formal
structure of the Article V amendment process.2 And Larry
Kramer describes the New Deal and its relation to federalism and
the political party system. 3  These scholars differ in their
interpretive theory and historical narrative. But they nevertheless
share a common theme: that federal constitutionalism, whatever
its scope and content, cannot be understood without some account
of the New Deal. 4
The New Deal is virtually absent from the literature on state
constitutions. 5 In part this may reflect the relative infancy of
state constitutional scholarship. Just twenty years have passed
since Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. invited state courts to give
independent meaning to the liberty-protecting provisions of state
constitutional texts. 6 Despite the publication of a casebook 7 and
a treatise on state constitutions, 8 the area remains somewhat on
renewed promotion of Madisonian representation, rejection of status quo
neutrality, and reinvigoration of local self-government).
2. 1 BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991)
(focusing on New Deal as "constitutional moment" effecting constitutional
change through self-conscious and mobilized activity of "We the People").
3. Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1485
(1994) (discussing New Deal, political parties, and federalism).
4. See, e.g., Larry Kramer, What's a Constitution for Anyway? History
and Theory, Bruce Ackerman and the New Deal, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
885, 891 (1996) (criticizing Ackerman's notion of "constitutional moments"
but acknowledging importance of New Deal to constitutional understanding).
5. Cf. JAMES T. PATTERSON, THE NEW DEAL AND THE STATES:
FEDERALISM IN TRANSITION ii (1969) (urging New Deal historians to "turn
from the excitement of Pennsylvania Avenue to the more prosaic events of
Albany, Atlanta, and Santa Fe").
6. See William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of
Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 491 (1977) (inviting state court
activism).
7. ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS (2d ed. 1993).
8. JENNIFER FRIESEN, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: LITIGATING
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS, CLAIMS AND DEFENSES (1992).
[Vol 13
2
Touro Law Review, Vol. 13 [1997], No. 3, Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol13/iss3/5
RIGHTS AMD FREEDOMS
the margin of academic attention. 9 More important, the New
Deal's absence from most state constitutional accounts may
reflect their interpretive bias: an approach that Neil H. Cogan
describes as "static" 10 and that tends to locate any state
constitutional text-whenever adopted or amended-in the political
culture of 1789.
The New Deal lacuna is an unfortunate gap in the state
constitutional literature. Because state constitutions are relatively
easy to amend, 11 many provisions are twentieth-century creations
that respond directly to New Deal concerns. 12 In particular,
these provisions embody the basic substantive features that
commentators associate with New Deal constitutionalism: a
repudiation of common law entitlements as the public law
baseline, a rejection of status quo neutrality as the metric for
distinguishing government action from inaction, and a
reformulation of citizenship as encompassing rights to material
well being. 13 Some of these clauses lack any explicit federal
9. The attention it attracts can be less than favorable. See. e.g., James
A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90 MICH. L.
REV. 761, 763 (1992) (describing state constitutional decision making as "a
vast wasteland of confusing, conflicting, and essentially unintelligible
pronouncements").
10. Neil H. Cogan, Moses and Modernism, 92 MICH. L. REv. 1347. 1352
(1994) (reviewing THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND THE STATES: THE COLONIAL AND
REVOLUTIONARY ORIGINS OF AMERICAN LIBERTIES (Patrick T. Conley & John
P. Kaminski eds., 1992); JENNIFER FRIESEN, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAw:
LITIGATING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS, CLAIMS AND DEFENSES (1992): REFERENCE
GUIDEs TO THE STATE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES (1991-94)).
11. See Note, Project Report: Toward an Activist Role for State Bills of
Rights, 8 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 271, 296 (1973) (noting "ease of state
constitutional amendment").
12. See Jed Rubenfeld, Reading tihe Constitution as Spoken. 104 YALE L.J.
1119, 1169-73 (1995). In these provisions, to use Rubenfeld's terminology,
the Great Depression forms the "paradigm case" of the "particular evils ... felt
to be intolerable" and "that demanded a constitutional transformation.' Id.
13. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 1, at 421-26 (associating New Deal
constitutionalism with rejection of common law baseline and of status quo
neutrality).
19971
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analogue and impose positive duties on state government to
provide public assistance, health care, and affordable housing. 14
This essay begins the task of contextualizing state constitutional
provisions in their New Deal history. It also sketches the
implications of this history for state constitutional interpretation.
I look at this problem by examining Article XVII of the New
York Constitution, a Depression-era clause that guarantees the
"aid, care and support of the needy" 15 and that has been
compared favorably with the humanitarian goals of the United
Nations Declaration of Human Rights. 16  At a time when
commentators are debating the compatibility of positive rights
with liberal constitutional regimes, 17 New York's welfare
provision provides an opportunity to revisit many foundational
questions of constitutional theory: What is a constitution? What
is its domain? What is its relation to material well being? While
answers to these questions (indeed, the questions themselves) are
largely beyond the scope of this essay, they necessarily form the
background concerns. 18
14. See Burt Neuborne, Foreword: State Constitutions and the Evolution of
Positive Rights, 20 RUTGERS L.J. 881, 893-95 & nn.60-82 (1989) (describing
positive welfare commitments of some state constitutional texts).
15. N.Y. CONST. art. XVII, § 1. This provisions states: "The aid, care
and support of the needy are public concerns and shall be provided by the state
and by such of its subdivisions, and in such manner and by such means, as the
legislature may from time to time determine." Id.
16. See PETER J. GALIE, THE NEW YORK STATE CONSTITUTION: A
REFERENCE GUIDE 242 (1991) (making international comparison).
17. Compare Herman Schwartz, Do Economic and Social Rights Belong in
a Constitution?, 10 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 1233 (1995) (arguing in favor
of positive rights as appropriate constitutional guarantees) with Cass R.
Sunstein, Against Positive Rights, 1993 E. EUR. CONST. REV. 35 (1993)
(arguing against positive rights as appropriate constitutional guarantees).
18. This talk focuses on welfare examples in part because, from 1983-
1987, I was an attorney with The Legal Aid Society of New York, Civil
Appeals & Law Reform Unit, and from 1987-1995, associate legal director of
the American Civil Liberties Union responsible for the ACLU's work in the
area of race and poverty. The focus has other advantages. In particular, it
puts into sharp relief the meaning of the "New Judicial Federalism" and the
extent to which states may extend more generous rights and liberties to
members of their community.
[Vol 13
4
Touro Law Review, Vol. 13 [1997], No. 3, Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol13/iss3/5
RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS
The topic of this essay also has current practical significance.
The end of the AFDC program, and the consequent elimination
of any federal safety net for the nation's poor, has raised
concerns that states will engage in "a race to the bottom" in the
design of their new block-grant welfare regimes.19 Because the
federal constitution has been interpreted to afford no affirmative
right to welfare, 20 commentators anticipate that it will provide an
ineffective bulwark against local retrenchment. 2 1  The major
constitutional challenges to the new welfare programs are
therefore likely to take place in state courts under state
constitutional provisions that afford substantive protection to the
poor.22 Paul A. Kahn, among others, has suggested that state
courts could thus become the major expositors of fairness norms
for the nation's poor. 23 In a state in which 17 percent of the
19. "AFDC" refers to the Aid to Families with Dependent Children
program, 42 U.S.C.A. § 601 et seq. (West 1996). In August 1996. Congress
repealed the AFDC program and replaced it instead with a system of block
grants that devolves authority for welfare policy on states and localities. See
HELEN HERSHKOFF & STEPHEN LOFFREDO, THE RIGHTS OF THE POOR
(forthcoming 1997) (discussing repeal of AFDC and substitution of system of
block grants); Note, Devolving Welfare Programs to the States: A Public
Choice Perspective, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1984, 1985 (1996) (discussing strong
possibility that states will engage in "a race to the bottom" in developing block-
grant programs).
20. See Stephen Loffredo, Poverm,, Democracy and Constitutional Law.
141 U. PA. L. REV. 1277, 1305-1313 (1993) (describing rise and demise of
federal right to welfare).
21. But see Laurence H. Tribe, Unraveling National League of Cities: The
New Federalism amd Affinnative Rights to Essential Government Services. 90
HARV. L. REv. 1065, 1065 (1977) (suggesting that elimination of federal
statutory support for welfare, and resulting increase in human suffering and
social dislocation, might affect Supreme Court poverty jurisprudence).
22. Cf. David Firestone, The Welfare Bill: The Gitn': Ne'w York Costs for
Its Progran Seen as Surging, N.Y. TLmES, Aug. 1, 1996. at Al (quoting
Mayor Giuliani of New York City that with elimination of AFDC, Article
XVII of New York Constitution will require "Itihe state and city ... to make
up that difference" to poor people).
23. See Paul W. Kahn, State Constitutionalisn and the Problems of
Fairness, 30 VAL. U. L. REV. 459, 460 (1996) (predicting important
19971 635
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population is officially poor, and more than 1.2 million
individuals depend on AFDC and SSI for subsistence, 24 the
interpretive stakes are very high.25
The approach of this essay is both internal to Article XVII and
historical; it takes seriously the idea that the New York
Constitution is "a deliberate, considered expression of
fundamental values. '"26 Part I describes the New York court's
decision-making approach to Article XVII and locates the cases
within a three-part typology that inversely correlates the strength
of judicial review with that of legislative discretion. Part II
suggests that the New York court's interpretive approach
comports neither with the language nor the history of Article
XVII. Part III offers an alternative way to read the text that fits
more closely with Article XVII's explicit New Deal commitments
and that takes better account of the special institutional position
of state courts. Part IV is a brief conclusion.
I
Article XVII, § 1 provides that the "aid, care and support of
the needy are public concerns and shall be provided by the state
and by such of its subdivisions, and in such manner and by such
means, as the legislature may from time to time determine." 27
The New York court2 8 has read Article XVII to create a
normative role for state courts in elaboration of fairness norms under state
constitutions).
24. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES 1996, THE NATIONAL DATA BOOK 474 tbl.735 (calculating
"Persons Below Poverty Level, by State: 1980-1994").
25. See Vincent Martin Bonventre, New York's Chief Judge Kaye: Her
Separate Opinions Bode Well for Renewed State Constitutionalism at the Court
of Appeals, 67 TEMP. L. REV. 1163, 1164 (1994) (discussing interpretive shift
on New York Court of Appeals in favor of robust state constitutionalism).
26. See James A. Gardner, Wat is a State Constitution?, 24 RUTGERS
L.J. 1025, 1028 (1993) (rejecting idea that state constitutions reflect distinct
state differences or thoughtful deliberation).
27. N.Y. CONST. art. XVII, § 1.
28. By "New York court" I mean the state's multileveled judicial system
that includes but is not limited to the New York Court of Appeals.
636 [Vol 13
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judicially enforceable right to public assistance that is "a
fundamental part of the social contract"2 9 between New York and
its needy residents. At the same time, however, the court has
accorded the legislature broad "discretion in determining the
means by which this objective is to be effectuated, in determining
the amount of aid, and in classifying recipients and defining the
term 'needy. "'30 This Part describes the kinds of issues that
Article XVII cases raise and the New York court's decision-
making approach to them.
Article XVII cases may be seen as dealing with three aspects of
legislative discretion. In the first type of case, the question is
whether the state has withheld public assistance from a litigant
who meets the state's statutory definition of needy. Here the
plaintiff claims membership in a prescribed legal category of
poor people to whom the state has extended assistance but
complains that she or he has been denied the specified benefit.
Type-one cases reflect the positivist conception of entitlement
that Charles Reich elaborated in his now classic article, The New
Property,3 1 and that the Court endorsed in its landmark decision.
Goldberg v. Kelly32 : Welfare benefits "are a matter of statutory
entitlement for persons qualified to receive them." 33 Within the
positive boundary of the authorizing statute, the state has no
discretion to withhold a benefit from a claimant who meets the
duly-enacted standard of "needy."
Type-one cases thus ask whether the government has correctly
applied a legal norm to a particular individual or class of
individuals similarly situated to members of a legislatively
defined group. The older view of welfare as a privilege to be
granted or denied as a matter of administrative discretion is
explicitly rejected in Type-one cases, 34 and the legislature has no
29. Tucker v. Toia, 43 N.Y.2d 1, 7 (1977).
30. Id. at 8.
31. Charles Reich, The New Property. 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
32. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
33. Id. at 262.
34. See Wilkie v. O'Connor, 25 N.Y.S.2d 617, 619 (App. Div. 1941)
(describing welfare payments as "charity").
1997] 637
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authority to depart from a definition of needy that the political
process has itself generated. The court applies in these cases a
bright-line approach, without any balancing, thus vigorously
enforcing standards that presumably come with the aura of
democratic accountability .35
The leading case in the Type-one category is Tucker v. Toia,3 6
which involved a challenge to state regulations that had been
amended to deny Home Relief benefits to youths who live on
their own and do not have a judicial order of support against
legally responsible adults. 3 7 The effect of the amendment, which
was adopted to achieve fiscal savings, was to place the burden of
obtaining a final judicial order of disposition on the minor child
seeking relief.38  In striking down the provision, the court
reasoned that because the legislature cannot directly refuse aid to
the needy, it cannot indirectly do so by imposing administrative
requirements "having nothing to do with need." 39
The second question that Article XVII cases can raise concerns
the location of the legislative border that defines the statutory
concept of needy. Here the claimant is an impoverished
individual who is excluded from a state created welfare program
but who claims a right to relief because of functional similarity to
persons within the existing legislative category. In Type-two
cases, the legislature is assumed to possess plenary power to
define the standards that construct the statutory category of needy
and that limit membership in the group of needy persons eligible
for assistance. In the cases so far, the court will rarely accept a
substantive challenge to the underinclusiveness of the state's
35. Cf Martha Morgan, Adam S. Cohen & Helen Hershkoff, Establishing
Education Program Inadequacy, 28 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 559, 586-94
(1995) (discussing role of democratically enacted, positive state standards in
enforcement of state constitutional right to adequate education).
36. 43 N.Y.2d 1 (1977).
37. Home Relief is the state's residual general assistance program and is
funded exclusively from state and local sources. See N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW §
158 (McKinney 1996).
38. See Tucker v. Toia, 89 Misc.2d 116, 119-20 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977),
aff'd, 43 N.Y.2d 1 (1977).
39. Tucker, 43 N.Y.2d at 8.
638 [Vol 13
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classification. 40 As long as the statutory border is plausibly cast
in economic terms, the court is typically satisfied that the
legislature has complied with Article XVII's mandate and it does
not scrutinize the actual reasonableness of the law. For example,
in Barie v. Lavine,4 1 the court upheld the constitutionality of
regulations allowing the thirty-day suspension of welfare benefits
to Home Relief recipients who refuse without good cause to
accept employment. The Barie plaintiff had missed a single work
appointment, and there was no evidence of "intermittent or
multiple refusals ... to accept employment." 42 Nevertheless, the
court held that "[tihe Legislature may in its discretion deny aid to
employable persons who may properly be deemed not to be
needy when they have wrongfully refused an opportunity for
employment. "43
The third question that Article XVII cases can raise concerns
the type, amount, and form of assistance that the state has chosen
to provide; the challenge is typically to the adequacy of the relief
program and the level of benefits that it provides. The leading
case is Bernstein v. Toia,44 which upheld the state's decision to
eliminate a system of special grants in favor of a fixed, capped
schedule of benefits. 45 "[T]he Legislature," the court explained,
"is vested with discretion to determine the amount of aid." 46
Although the court in Type-three cases typically treats the issue
as justiciable, so that plaintiff loses on the merits, in practice the
legislature is afforded discretion that is final and beyond review.
The court's approach to Article XVII thus draws a line between
challenges dealing with exclusions of needy persons from existing
welfare programs and challenges to the adequacy of assistance
40. For a notable exception, see Lee v. Smith. 43 N.Y.2d 453 (1977)
(striking down section of New York Social Services Law that excluded SSI
recipients from Home Relief program).
41. 40 N.Y.2d 565 (1976).
42. Id. at 570 (Jones, J., dissenting).
43. Id. at 570.
44. 43 N.Y.2d 437 (1977).
45. Id. at 440.
46. Id. at 449.
19971 639
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provided under any particular program. The court will review,
with varying degrees of intensity, questions of exclusion. But it
takes a hands-off approach to questions of adequacy, on the view
that these involve choices best left to the electoral process.
II
The New York court's approach to Article XVII is typical of
federal constitutional welfare analysis. 47 But it is an approach,
this Part suggests, that does not fit with the text or history of
Article XVII. In particular, the court fails to protect the poor
against the primary danger to which Article XVII is directed: the
danger of government indifference to the needs of the poor.48
The court consistently invokes legislative discretion as the
ground for its hands-off approach to questions of welfare
adequacy. Most contemporary discussions of discretion focus on
its exercise by judicial and administrative actors. Legislative
discretion, by contrast, features as an inevitable part of the
political landscape. In a general sense discretion is the defining
quality of legislative power: the freedom to make policy choices
that the other branches of government must respect. Such
discretion leaves the government actor "free to make a choice
among possible courses of action or inaction." 49  The electoral
47. Federal constitutional welfare analysis consistently leaves intact
decisions about levels of welfare assistance but at times has taken a somewhat
tougher look at exclusions of poor people from existing assistance programs.
See Tribe, supra note 21, at 1089 & n.100 (citing Frank I. Michelman, In
Pursuit of Constitutional Welfare Rights: One View of Rawls' Theory of
Justice, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 962 (1973) (describing federal approach));
compare United States Dept. of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 (1973)
(striking down "tax dependent" provision of food stamp act that denied food
stamps to otherwise eligible households) with Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S.
471 (1970) (upholding cap on AFDC payments that limited assistance
regardless of family size and actual need).
48. Cf. Sunstein, supra note 1, at 433 (stating that New Deal
constitutionalism is driven by fear of government inaction, just as
constitutionalism of founding period was driven by fear of government action).
49. KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY
INQUIRY 4 (1969).
640 [Vol 13
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process legitimates the legislature's choices and subjects them to
control.50 The idea of discretion as choice is allied in important
ways with a negative-rights model of a constitution, which
requires government to take no particular action but simply
restrains the exercise of power within a prescribed domain. If
legislative power is aimless and without commitment, then any
legislative choice is plausible. In a world without positive duties,
legislative discretion, to use Ronald Dworkin's famous metaphor,
is "the hole in the doughnut, ... an area left open by a
surrounding belt of restriction." 5 1
Discretion as choice-or at least unconstrained choice--makes
less sense in a legal regime that commits government to use
power for specific purposes. Article XVII was designed to make
permanent a basic policy choice that the legislature is mandated
to achieve. It thus articulates a substantive commitment, creating
"an environment of constraint, of ... ideals to be fulfilled," 52
which ought to affect the quality and scope of a court's review.
To borrow from D. J. Galligan, the duty of a legislature vested
with authority such as the kind afforded under Article XVII "is to
realize and advance the objects and purposes for which ...
powers have been granted.53 Because the state constitution "is a
source of positive law, not merely a set of limitations on
government," 54 judicial review, to keep legislative power within
the bounds of law, must constrain discretion so that it achieves
the affirmative constitutional mandate.
Article XVII conspicuously does not speak in terms of
legislative discretion. It instead has a bifurcated structure of duty
and power that is unfamiliar to the federal constitution. Article
50. See William A. Fletcher, The Discretionary Constitution: Institutional
Remedies and Judicial Legitimacy, 91 YALE L.J. 635, 642 (1982) (discussing
electoral controls over legislative discretion).
51. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 31 (1978).
52. PHILIP SELZNICK, LAW, SOCIETY, AND INDUSTRIAL JUSTICE 11 (1978)
(quoted in Robert C. Post, The Management of Speech: Discretion and Rights,
1984 Sup. CT. REV. 169, 207 & n.161 (1984)).
53. D.J. GALLIGAN, DISCRETIONARY POWERS: A LEGAL STUDY OF
OFFICIAL DISCRETiO N 16-17 (1986).
54. Brown v. New York, 89 N.Y.2d 172, 187 (1996).
19971
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XVII begins with words of command, mandating the legislature
to provide forms of public assistance to the poor ("[t]he aid, care
and support of the needy ... shall be provided by the state and by
such of its subdivisions") and concludes with words of
permission, affording flexibility and open-ended authority to the
legislature in its performance of this duty ("and in such manner
and by such means, as the legislature may from time to time
determine"). The clauses are sequential and conjunctive, first
imposing an obligation on the legislature and then empowering
the legislature to meet this obligation through the use of any
possible device. The individual's right to assistance is thus
interconnected with the government's power to effectuate the
right. 55
The design and purpose of Article XVII can only be understood
against the background understandings of the New Deal. 5 6
Robert M. Cover has written that "[e]ach constitutional
generation organizes itself around paradigmatic events .... ,57
Article XVII was adopted as a result of the 1938 Constitutional
Convention. 58  For the delegates who convened in 1938 to
55. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Individual Rights and the Powers of
Government, 27 GA. L. REV. 343 (1993) (describing interconnection of
individual rights and government power).
56. See Lawrence Lessig, What Drives Derivability: Responses to
Responding to Imperfection, 74 TEx. L. REV. 839, 854 (1996) (claiming that
"background understandings constitute the meaning of a foreground text, and
that one cannot understand what a text means unless one understands these
background understandings as well") (reviewing RESPONDING TO
IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL
AMENDMENT (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995)).
57. Robert M. Cover, The Origins of Judicial Activism in the Protection of
Minorities, 91 YALE L.J. 1287, 1316 (1982).
58. The 1938 Constitutional Convention was held pursuant to the 1894
New York Constitution, which required the voters to decide every twenty
years whether a convention should take place to amend the constitution. The
1938 convention was the second to take place in New York in the twentieth
century. Recommendations from the first, held in 1915, were rejected by
popular vote. See Frieda Almira Gillette, The New York State Constitutional
Convention of 1938, at 1 (1944) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Cornell
University) (on file with Cornell University Library).
642 [Vol 13
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consider amending the New York Constitution, the defining
events were the Great Depression and the rise of
totalitarianism.59 If the democratic order was to survive, the
state had to forge a new social contract with its members, one
that made explicit the government's responsibility to protect its
citizens against the misfortunes of an unregulated market. "We
are here to do one thing, if nothing else," declared Judge
Frederick E. Crane on his election as President of the 1938
Constitutional Convention. "To prove to the world that our form
of government does work; that it will work efficiently, and can
meet the problems of the day and the necessities of the times
".... 60 Later at the Convention, Senator Robert F. Wagner, Jr.
explained that the constitutional goal was to meet "the threat to
freedom that comes from another source--from poverty and
insecurity, from sickness and the slum, from social and economic
conditions in which human beings cannot be free." 6 1
Social and economic conditions at the time of the Convention
gave shape and content to the delegates' constitutional
priorities. 62 In an important sense, the delegates were concerned
with what Frank I. Michelman has called "demoralization costs"-
-the potentially destructive reaction of individuals to legal orders
that fail to respond to normative claims. 63 At the time of the
Convention, New York was just beginning to lift itself from the
59. See Galie, supra note 16, at 25 (stating that the Great Depression made
"it difficult for delegates to ignore social and economic issues .... The Great
Depression had forced public officials to reevaluate their understanding of the
role of government in society, labor was a more potent force than it had been
in 1915, and the New Deal was in full swing both in the state and nation").
60. VERNON A. O'RoURKE & DOUGLAS W. CAMPBELL, CONSTITULTION-
MAKING IN A DEMOCRACY: THEORY AND PRACTICE IN NEW YORK STATE 1
(1943) (quoting speeches of Constitutional Convention).
61. Id. at 117.
62. Note, A Right to Shelter for die Homeless in New York State, 61
N.Y.U. L. REv. 272, 285-89 (1986) (describing social and economic
conditions at time of 1938 Convention).
63. See Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments
on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARv. L. REV.
1165, 1214 (1967) (defining demoralization costs).
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Great Depression, which had profoundly affected the state's
industrial and agricultural base. 64  In the four-year period
beginning 1929, industrial jobs dropped from over one million to
little more than 700,000, and wages correspondingly fell.
Unemployment became pervasive. By 1933, more than one and
a half million New Yorkers were receiving some kind of
assistance, and many more needed relief but went unaided. 65 As
Harry Hopkins put it, in a speech to the National Council of
Social Work that year, "[W]e are dealing with all classes. It is
no longer a matter of unemployables and chronic dependents, but
your friends and mine. " 66
Article XVII had two closely related purposes.
The first was to impose on state government a mandatory
obligation to provide assistance to the poor. In the pre-New Deal
world of Lochner,67 government was expected to remain neutral
in the face of market disaster; regulatory intervention of any sort
was potentially unconstitutional as a deviation from the common
law baseline. 68 Article XVII altered the baseline by making
government inaction in the face of individual need
unconstitutional. It thus constrained legislative power by
mandating its use for a particular purpose, constitutionalizing
extensive statutory commitments embodied in the state's revised
social services law. 69  "Here are words," the Committee on
64. For a history of this period in New York, see generally WILLIAM W.
BREMER, DEPRESSION WINTERS: NEW YORK SOCIAL WORKERS AND THE NEW
DEAL (1984); JOHN D. MILLETT, THE WORKS PROGRESS ADMINISTRATION IN
NEW YORK CITY (1938); DAVID M. SCHNEIDER & ALBERT DEUTSCH, THE
HISTORY OF PUBLIC WELFARE IN NEW YORK STATE 1867-1940 (1941).
65. See JOAN M. CROUSE, THE HOMELESS TRANSIENT IN THE GREAT
DEPRESSION: NEW YORK STATE, 1929-1941 53 (1986).
66. ROBERT E. SHERWOOD, ROOSEVELT AND HOPKINS: AN INTIMATE
HISTORY 212 (1948).
67. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
68. See Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM L. REV. 873, 874
(1987) (discussing understandings of Lochner court).
69. See O'Rourke & Campbell, supra note 60, at 161 (stating that Article
XVII was constitutional safeguard "anticipating possible judicial decisions
which would nullify rights" of the poor).
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Social Welfare reported, "which set forth a definite policy of
government, a concrete obligation which no court may ever
misread." 70 The state's duty to meet its Article XVII obligation
was to exist "not only in periods of grave emergency, as at
present, but even in time of normal unemployment when the need
may be reduced in measure but certainly not in nature. ",7 1
The state undertook this welfare obligation despite federal
retrenchment from the relief front. By the time of the
Convention, the federal government had dismantled the Federal
Emergency Relief Administration, thus returning the problem of
general relief to the states. 72  Many states correspondingly
reduced their own assistance efforts. New York, by contrast,
committed itself in Article XVII to a network of social support
far more protective than the Social Security Act of 1935, which
contained significant omissions in terms of coverage and
benefits. 73 On the floor of the Convention, Committee members
specifically denounced the failure of other states to meet the
needs of the poor in this period, referring, for example, to the
"brutal callousness to human suffering ... witnessed in the State
of New Jersey" when the State Relief Council closed in 1936. 74
70. STATE OF NEW YORK, REVISED RECORD, PROCEEDINGS OF 1938 NEW
YORK STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 2126 (Statement of Edward
Corsi, Chair of Convention's Committee on Social Welfare) [hereinafter
RECORD].
71. Id. Commentators frequently associate the statutory-like detail of state
constitutional provisions with distrust of legislative power. As Robert
Williams explains, "[The insertion of specific 'constitutional legislation'" is
intended to "supplant[! legislative prerogatives" on particular social objectives.
Robert Williams, State Constitutional Law Processes, 24 WM & MARY L.
REv. 168, 201-02 (1983).
72. See JACOB FISHER, THE RESPONSE OF SOCIAL WORK TO THE
DEPRESSION 57 (1980) (describing federal retrenchment from general relief
efforts after enactment of Social Security Act of 1935).
73. See generally William H. Simon, Rights and Redistribution in the
Welfare System, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1431 (1986) (discussing political
compromises of Social Security Act of 1935).
74. RECORD, supra note 70, at 2126; see also All Relief Ends in Jersey;
Local Areas Must Feed 270,000, N.Y. TIMES, April 17, 1936. at I (quoted in
Tucker v. Toia, 89 Misc.2d 116, 123 & n.19 (Sup. Ct. Monroe Co. 1977)).
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The second purpose of Article XVII was to ensure that the state
had full authority to carry out this new constitutional duty.
Throughout the early years of the Depression, one of New
York's central challenges had been to defend the legality of its
relief efforts as an exercise of the police power. As the
Convention's Social Welfare Committee stated in its explanatory
report, Article XVII was intended "to remove all doubt as to the
power of the legislature to authorize relief for those in need and
to allocate responsibility therefore to the State and its political
subdivisions." As later explained on the floor of the Convention:
The Legislature may continue the system of relief now in
operation. It may preserve the present plan of reimbursement to
the localities. It may devise new ways of dealing with the
problem. Its hands are untied. What it may not do is shirk its
responsibility which, in the opinion of the committee, is as
fundamental as any responsibility of government. 75
By according constitutional status to welfare claims. Article XVII
also recognized their priority relative to other government
responsibilities. The state's earlier social services law had been
interpreted to make assistance available only "as far as possible"
and "in so far as funds are available. "76 Under Article XVII, by
contrast, welfare was no longer to be a matter of expedience but
rather a mandatory feature of the social contract. As a member
of the Social Welfare Committee stated on the Convention floor,
"We feel that up to that very last penny where somebody needs
help to eat and to have shelter and to preserve body and soul,
there is a claim on the state."77 In order to ensure that adequate
levels of assistance became available throughout the state, a state
mandate was thus substituted for local responsibility.
The constitutional language, "in such manner and by such
means," was thus intended to overcome constitutional doubts
about the scope of the state's power in meeting the needs of the
75. RECORD, supra note 70, at 2126.
76. Schneider & Deutsch, supra note 64, at 286-88.
77. RECORD, supra note 70, at 2126.
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poor. It was also intended to afford the legislature broad
authority to meet the constitutional goal. Such language was
typical of the New Deal, 78 a time of great plasticity and
experimentation, when those involved in forging the new
regulatory order spoke of the "ideal state ... as a process of
becoming." 79  The open-ended language of Article XVII also
responded to one of the major criticisms of earlier state
constitutions: that their excessive detail prevented the state from
meeting new challenges and from adapting to changed
circumstances. Article XVII was drafted to encourage innovation
and to allow progressive improvement. But nothing in its
language or history explicitly or impliedly repeals a New York
court's duty to check legislative power and to constrain its use
for mandated constitutional purposes.
III
The New York court's approach to Article XVII, especially in
Type-three cases, is familiar: it hesitates to scrutinize laws that
implicate budget decisions or would require the reallocation of
public funds; it hesitates to become involved in areas that seem to
require special expertise; and it hesitates to use adjudication to
resolve disputes that involve social priorities. Such an approach
is unremarkable. For it is a model of judicial power typical to
post-Lochner federal constitutional adjudication. What is
78. Cf. Case Conunent, FSLIC Discretion in Insuring State-Chartered
Institutions: West Helena Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Federal Home Loan Bank
Board, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1090, 1093-94 & n.25 (1978) (discussing absence
of specific criteria in 1934 legislation regulating Federal Savings and Loan
Insurance Corporation).
79. Mark Barenberg, The Political Economy of the Wagner Act: Power,
Symbol, and Work Tlace Cooperation, 106 HARV. L. REv. 1379, 1413 (1993)
(quoting Robert Wagner, The Ideal hIdustrial State, N.Y. TIMES, May 9.
1937. Magazine at 8. Many historians have noted the "experimental"
atmosphere of the New Deal period. See, e.g.. SUSAN WARE. BEYOND
SUFFRAGE: WOMEN IN THE NEW DEAL 6 (1981) (describing "experimental.
reformist atmosphere of the New Deal").
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remarkable, however, is its lack of fit with the special
institutional position of state courts.
State courts differ from the federal in a number of important
respects. State courts are uninhibited by concerns of federalism,
which federal courts frequently invoke to explain their refusal to
second guess local decisions affecting social and economic
issues. 80  State courts also carry the advantages and
disadvantages of greater political accountability, which afford
their decision making an enhanced aura of legitimacy and also
works to mitigate concerns about finality. 8 1 And state courts
have the generative power of the common law, 82 giving them a
distinct institutional advantage over state legislatures, which often
"lack the resources needed for sophisticated policy analysis." 83
Building on the insight of state court difference, I have suggested
elsewhere that state courts should assume a more active posture
in enforcing state constitutional guarantees. 84 This Part explores
this possibility by offering an alternative approach to the New
York court's enforcement of Article XVII.
80. See, e.g., San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 41
(1973) (relying on federalism in rejecting equal protection challenge to
disparities in state funding of public schools).
81. See Judith S. Kaye, Contributions of State Constitutional Law to the
Third Century of American Federalism, 13 VT. L. REV. 49, 56 (1988)
(contending that "State courts are generally closer to the public, to the legal
institutions and the environments within the state, and to the public policy
process").
82. See Judith S. Kaye, State Courts at the Dawn of a New Century:
Common Law Courts Reading Statutes and Constitutions, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1, 2 (1995) (discussing policy making role of common law courts).
83. Note, State Economic Substantive Due Process: A Proposed Approach,
88 YALE L.J. 1487, 1490 (1979).
84. Helen Hershkoff, State Constitutions: A National Perspective, 3
WIDENER J. PUB. L. 7, 9 (1993) (discussing differences between state and
federal courts and implications for judicial review). See Lawrence Gene
Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional
Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1255 (1978) (describing different institutional
position of state and federal judiciaries and implications for enforcement of
federal constitutional norms).
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Let us assume that New York decides to design its new block-
grant program by providing cash welfare benefits that are subject
to incremental percentage decreases after the first eighteen
months of assistance. The stated rationale is that indigent
families need economic disincentives to encourage them to seek
wage employment. 85 A challenge is filed under Article XVII. In
particular, the law suit alleges, the legislature has failed to
account for labor market reductions and the lack of available jobs
for welfare recipients. A court faced with such a challenge
would have to determine whether the legislature's decision to
reduce welfare benefits below minimum subsistence levels meets
the legitimate needs of the poor. The fact that the legislature has
discretion to design a welfare plan, plaintiffs would argue, does
not give the legislature discretion to design a plan that does not
actually effectuate Article XVII's mandate.
Courts enforce positive claims of this sort more often than the
conventional literature acknowledges. Even federal courts
enforce claims to particular services or ensure compliance with
substantive duties of care. Thus, for example, federal courts
enforce positive claims to damages for compensable takings
under the Fifth Amendment 86 as well as positive claims to
treatment and care by the mentally retarded and the mentally ill
under the Fourteenth Amendment. 87  On a subconstitutional
85. The hypothetical is modeled roughly on proposed welfare legislation
submitted by Governor George Pataki on November 13, 1996 to implement the
Personal Responsibility, Work Opportunity, and Medicaid Reconciliation Act
of 1996. See The Welfare Working Group, The Association of tile Bar of the
Cii. of New York's Review of the Pataki Welfare Plan. 52 THE RECORD OF THE
ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR 13, 13 (1997).
86. See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994). The Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides: "IN]or shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
87. See, e.g., New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children. Inc. v.
Carey, 393 F. Supp. 715 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (challenge to conditions in
Willowbrook State School). The author was co-counsel in this action from
1979-1985. The Fourteenth Amendment provides: "No State shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of
the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life. liberty, or
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level, federal administrative agencies police compliance efforts
by regulated industries and also determine the substantive
compatibility of agency rules with statutory norms. 88  State
courts enforce (and indeed create) common law duties of care,
the execution of which may be committed to the discretion of the
duty holder, such as a corporate officer or other representative in
a fiduciary position of trust. 89 And state courts enforce state
constitutional provisions guaranteeing a range of positive rights,
such as the right to an adequate education. 90
These positive rights cases provide a useful analogy for a New
York court asked to review the adequacy of the state's welfare
efforts. Certain threads appear in the cases that can potentially
be woven into a standard of review. At a minimum, Article
XVII review should entail a procedural component in which the
court takes a "hard look" at the legislative record and determines
whether the challenged law rests on empirical support or on
speculation and stereotype. 9 1  Searching review of this sort
serves a number of important goals. As with clear statement
rules, the hard look approach forces the legislature to take its
Article XVII responsibilities seriously and to engage in
meaningful deliberation on an issue of profound social
importance. The hard look approach also insists that the
legislature assume political accountability for its choices because
it must now create a decision-making record and make that
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
88. See, e.g., Motor Vehicles Manufacturers Ass'n v. State Farm Ins.
Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42 (1983) (defining arbitrary and capricious standard of
review).
89. See Jay P. Moran, Business Judgment Rule or Relic? Cede v.
Technicolor and the Continuing Metamorphosis of Director Duty of Care, 45
EMORY L. J. 339 (1996) (discussing judicial enforcement of business judgment
rule).
90. See Morgan, Cohen & Hershkoff, supra note 35, at 561 & n. I1
(pointing to Kentucky, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and New Jersey as
states in which state courts have enforced state constitutional rights to adequate
education).
91. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995) (reviewing
legislative fact finding under Commerce Clause).
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record available for public scrutiny. And the hard look approach
polices the legislative process to ensure that impermissible factors
do not taint the ultimate regulatory classification.
In addition, Article XVII review must entail a substantive
component. The court has to consider whether the legislature's
choices will reasonably effectuate the goal of meeting the
legitimate needs of the poor. As in any case involving an
affirmative claim to government services, the court will first have
to develop a baseline or norm against which to assess the
adequacy of the state's response. So, for example. in the private
sphere, child support orders require a judicial determination of
how much it takes to raise a child within the financial parameters
of a particular family. 92 Similarly, courts in public law cases
typically rely on professional standards in developing a baseline
to assess the constitutional adequacy of such things as prison
conditions or the care of children placed in foster care. 93
Professional norms afford an important starting point in the
analysis. But they do not replace the court's responsibility to
facilitate the evolution of standards through the process of
common law constitutionalism.
IV
Article XVII promises the poor of New York a "New Deal" in
welfare rights: a commitment that their legitimate claims will be
heard and enforced in the political process. It is easy for elected
representatives to overlook the needs of underresourced
constituents or casually to mistreat them. By taking a serious
look at the legislature's enforcement of Article XVII. the court
92. See Nan D. Hunter, Women and Child Support. in FAMILIES.
POLITICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY: A FEMINIST DIALOGUE ON WOMEN AND THE
STATE 203-15 (Irene Diamond ed. 1983) (discussing role of standards in child
support orders).
93. See Susan Stefan, Leaving Civil Rights to the "Erperts': From
Deference to Abdication under the Professional Judgment Standard. 102 YALE
L.J. 639 (1992) (discussing professional judgment standard under Fourteenth
Amendment).
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can take a step to improve law making in an area of constitutional
priority. In this essay, I have tried to sketch out the contours of
what an alternative approach to poor people's claims under
Article XVII might entail. It is only the beginning of a
conversation on this issue. But the importance of the project
should be clear. For in constraining the legislature to achieve a
constitutional goal, the court, in Benjamin Cardozo's phrase,
reveals its "chief worth": "in making vocal and audible the ideals
that might otherwise be silenced, in giving them continuity of life
and of expression, in guiding and directing choice within the
limits where choice ranges. ",94
94. BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 94
(1921).
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